SECTION I. INTRODUCTION

1. This general officer led inspection of Combined Forces Command – Afghanistan (CFC-A) Area of Operations (AO) detainee operations was initiated at the direction of the Commander, CFC-A, in FRAGO 48, dated 18 May 2004 (Enclosure A). The Commander, Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)-76, subsequently appointed BG Charles H. Jacoby Jr. to lead this inspection (Enclosure B). The inspection was conducted beginning 19 May 2004 and continued through 26 June 2004. Consistent with specific instructions contained in the appointment memorandum, this inspection relied upon the support of the CJTF-76 staff and their efforts to conduct collateral reviews and evaluations, and also considered previous and contemporaneous inspections and investigations of detainee operations conducted in this theater.

2. This inspection's primary purpose was to ascertain the standard of treatment provided to persons detained by US forces throughout the detention process from apprehension to release or long-term confinement. Initially, five focus areas defined the approach of the inspection: command and control (C3); medical treatment provided to detainees; collection area procedures; Soldier special instructions and general orders; and compliance with International humanitarian law as it applies to this conflict. Early in the inspection it became apparent that information and intelligence collection needed to be specifically addressed as a sixth focus area. The handling of detainees and intelligence and information collection are the two sub-processes of detainee operations. The authorities, procedures, and standards under which these processes are carried out set the conditions for the overall standard of treatment detainees receive in US custody.

3. While there was a near universal understanding in CJTF-76 that humane treatment was the standard by which detainees would be treated, guard awareness and application of standard operating procedures (SOP) was lacking. Comprehensive SOPs do exist in theater, but dissemination, implementation, and a corresponding appreciation for assigned responsibilities were inconsistent across the AO. Failure to establish and enforce standards throughout the detention process creates friction on the process, which increases risk of detainee abuse and frustrates effective collection and dissemination of
intelligence and information. A lack of focused training for Soldiers responsible for both handling and collecting intelligence and information also increases the risk of potential abuse.

4. Detainee operations throughout the process have, in the past, been focused almost exclusively on its contribution to a counter-terrorism mission. On today's counter-insurgency battlefield where the population is the center of gravity and the direct object of our security and reconstruction efforts, detainee operations must become more discriminate and supportive of the overall mission. In this vein, persons under US control are not objects on the battlefield. They instead become part of the fabric of the battlefield where humane treatment is not just the standard but essential to successful operations.

5. Definitions (Enclosure C).

6. Conditions — Within a month of the Transfer of Authority (TOA) between the outgoing 10th Mountain Division and the incoming 25th Infantry Division (Light), allegations of detainee abuse surfaced in Iraq. Amidst concerns about the scope of these issues, this inspection was initiated within a command actively engaged in major combat operations and extensive civil-military operations. Approximately one-third of the bases visited as part of this inspection were established within the past three months or were under construction. All had either recently conducted a relief in place (RIP) or were in the process of a RIP. This same period also witnessed an on-going shift in operational focus from active counter-terrorism operations to complex counter-insurgency and stability operations.

SECTION II. SCOPE

7. This inspection focused across the CFC-A AO on the full spectrum of detainee operations as conducted by personnel assigned to, or working in cooperation with, CJTF-76. In addition to considering the viability of current regulatory guidance applicable to detainee operations, primarily that guidance found in the CJTF-180 Detainee Operations SOP, dated 27 March 2004 (Enclosure D), this inspection examined the current state of detainee operations in the field through eyes-on visits to all bases with facilities used to support detention operations (Enclosure E).

8. Consistent with the appointment order, this initiative was an inspection in name and spirit – the focus of this inspection was current theater detainee operations, and not the investigation of detainee abuse allegations. As part of the inspection process, units were provided training that emphasized current policy and areas of concern and, where required, given guidance on appropriate changes to local procedures and facilities.
9. Of specific interest in this inspection was the humane treatment of detainees. In accordance with US policy, members of Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations and Taliban fighters captured in Afghanistan do not qualify as Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW). It is US policy, however, that all detained individuals be treated humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity and security requirements, in a manner consistent with the principles of the Geneva Conventions (Enclosure F). As a result, the reference point for this inspection was humane treatment rather than strict adherence to each provision of the Conventions.

SECTION III. REFERENCES
(Enclosure G)

SECTION IV. OBSERVATIONS

General

10. The consistent and overarching observation that flowed from this inspection was that forces assigned to this command understand the concept of humane treatment and are providing humane treatment to detainees in accordance with the principles of the Geneva Convention. There have been exceptions, and allegations of detainee abuse have been substantiated. It is, however, clear that the priorities of safety for soldiers and guards, safeguarding detainees, and gaining short/long term intelligence can be accommodated within the framework of humane treatment as a standard (Enclosure H). Additionally, it was found that although the CJTF-180 Detainee Operations SOP, dated 27 March 2004, provides a foundation for the conduct of detainee operations throughout the Afghanistan theater, it does require revisions to:

a. confirm interrogation approaches and techniques that are authorized in this theater,

b. better define facility standards,

c. describe acceptable standards of conduct throughout the detention process,

d. provide for clearer guidance to capturing units concerning the proper collection and control of personal property and evidence obtained as a result of operations in the theater, and

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e. clarify that the SOP applies throughout Afghanistan and to all other units, organizations, and agencies working under the direction or in coordination with C/TF-76.

11. While theater forces understand the need for humane treatment and unit processes observed during the inspection were consistent with the spirit of extant doctrine, there was otherwise a consistent lack of knowledge regarding theater detention operations guidance as it applies to detainee capture, processing, evidence collection, chain of custody, detention; interrogation, movement, and repatriation. Only one-third of the bases had a copy of the current detainee operations SOP, which provides at least minimum insight into all of the above areas (excluding repatriation procedure, capture guidelines for evidence and chain of custody). To fill this perceived void, many bases attempted to integrate recently circulated draft theater policy, simply applied Army values, or followed the "Golden Rule" during their detainee operations. This situation has been further complicated by recent theater-wide turnover of combat and combat support units and the accompanying loss of experience. Lack of thoroughly authorized, disseminated, and understood guidance and procedures create opportunities for detainee abuse and the loss of intelligence value throughout the process.

12. According to 100% of the units inspected, there is significant need and demand for local intelligence that is not consistently met by current theater detainee operations. Timeframes to process detainees are focused on getting detainees who meet Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) detention criteria to the rear, while collection of battlefield intelligence is largely an ad hoc program based on leader experience and the capabilities of assigned personnel (Enclosure I).

13. Even though detainee processing standards were established with speeding detainees who meet SECDEF detention criteria to the rear in mind, there is no consistent program designed to ensure the integrity of capture data or evidence. Even where detention kits are available, detainee tags within the kits need to be redesigned to incorporate space for basis for detention is often poorly documented. As a result, quality interrogation is impeded and justification for detention limited. This occasionally leads to longer periods of detention than is justified.

14. Although SECDEF criteria for detention are generally known and understood, the approach to detaining personnel differs substantially across the theater. In some areas, few persons are detained unless there is a specific pre-existing justification or a threat to the force present. In other locations, cordon and search operations yield large numbers of detainees without apparent application of specific criteria. There is an inverse correlation
between the length of time a unit has been in theater and the number of individuals it detains. As a result, when a unit is replaced, the battle of perception in the local populace is

sorted out later.

15. Very significantly, there is inadequate authority for the interrogation techniques and approaches authorized by the Detainee Operations SOP dated 27 March 2004. However, consistent with the observation that only one-third of the bases had the SOP, it was generally not guidance known or relied upon in the field. In fact, there is a void in the availability of interrogations guidance in the field, and interrogation practice is as inconsistent and varied across the theater as are detention methods and procedures. There is some correlation between individual training and experience and interrogation methods being used, but there is little correlation between location and techniques employed. Inconsistent and unevenly applied standards in the detention and interrogations process increase the possibility of the abuse of detainees, especially forward in the battle area. Ironically, that same weakness in standards degrades the intelligence collection process with negative effects growing the further a detainee moves through the system.

16. Most units, while having received basic cultural training before deployment, were not truly attuned to the cultural sensitivities they encountered. While most units knew not to enter a Mosque unless invited or mission dictates, and some units specifically request female Soldiers to accompany them on missions to assist with the search of female detainees, there are situations where the cultural standards are not known and thus not adhered to. For example: situations where men are unnecessarily detained in front of their families, or caused to be seen naked when not required, or where dogs have been used in the past to intimidate or humiliate. These situations run afoul of Afghan culture and create unwarranted misperceptions about our actual intent to provide security and stability for the people of Afghanistan.

17. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 

Liason is provided by a judge advocate officer who, beginning in April 04, was assigned full-time.

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Specific Observations

18. Specific observations as they relate to key functional areas delineated in FRAGO 48 include:

a. Command and control - inconsistent throughout the theater. Likely accentuated by the general lack of theater-wide detention operations implementing guidance and instructions, there is a direct correlation between assigning responsibility for base/unit detainee operations to a single leader and the integrity of the process. Bases and units with a designated NCOIC/OIC of detention operations do it better; those with personal oversight of the local commander do it best. Additionally, the problem is aggravated by a lack of clear unity of command. Centralized C3 at the CJTF-76 level also needs to be evaluated, and a clear lead established between military police and military intelligence. Currently, there is no one individual below the CJTF-76 commander who is clearly responsible for the coordination, supervision and execution of detainee operations at the CJTF level.

b. Medical treatment - a favorable aspect of detainee operations across the theater. Detainees were uniformly offered medical evaluation and treatment far better than they had ever received. While treatment was expansive, efforts to sensitize medical exams and physical inspections to cultural norms need improvement. There has been no evidence to reinforce the need for rectal or hernia examinations, and little or no justification for requiring full-body nudity as a part of exams or inspections. Guidance removing these processes from our procedures has been issued as part of this inspection. All locations clearly understood that medical exams or inspections are not part of any interrogation method. Failure to establish an appropriate standard for the medical screening and care of detainees could create perceptions of or opportunities for detainee abuse.

c. Collection area procedures - up to the point of initial detention in a forward facility, procedures are confusing and inadequate. Specifically, units need better commanders created local facilities and adapted detention procedures to available experience and expertise. All wanted more guarantees that battlefield intelligence would be a by-product of detention.

d. Compliance with international humanitarian law standards as they apply to this conflict - although Common Article 3 of Geneva does not apply to either Al Qaeda or
Taliban detainees, it is US policy that we will treat detainees humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with Geneva.

The nature of detention operations is complicated and unpleasant, but providing humane treatment is the accepted standard across the theater (Enclosure J). Detention facilities across the theater differ markedly, just as facilities for assigned military personnel are different, and some are significantly better than others. All provide the basics of food, shelter; and medical care, but few could not find ways to be improved. Some facilities were constructed out of bed frames, others with Hesco, tarpage, lean-to's, and some in new or renovated buildings. Sanitation facilities at approximately 50% of the locations were only marginally acceptable. Suggestions for improving these facilities were issued as part of this inspection. By far, the most common corrections involved improving ventilation and defining standards for how detainees should be held (e.g., goggled, shackled). Many facilities, while adequate for summer, won’t be acceptable during the winter. As the theater matures and conditions for our forces improve, we have an opportunity to create corresponding improvements in our detention facilities.

c. Soldier special instructions and detention facility guard orders — at MP operated


detention facility guards in the interrogation process — security only — seems to be understood, but not as a result of deliberately disseminated policy guidance.

SECTION V. FINDINGS

General

19. CFC-A AO detention operations are functional, but lack cohesive direction, and are constrained by friction at critical junctures. Specifically, in addition to the previously discussed lack of comprehensive detention guidance, there are significant problems associated with timely aircraft movement of detainees, lines of communication critical to both processing detention approvals and receiving detainee operations guidance, and joint...
use of detention facilities. Current theater guidance is drafted clearly, but is not comprehensive or well known outside the task force headquarters. In addition, a comprehensive means of disseminating guidance, training, and inspecting detention operations needs to be developed.

Special Findings

20. Special findings focus on specific phases of detention operations including initial capture and detention, release, short/long term detention and movement within theater, transfer to military detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay, release and repatriation, interrogations, and overall process management (Enclosure M). All phases and C² of the process suffered from a lack of knowledge of current theater policy and procedures.

a. Initial capture – policy on initial capture is lacking. Units in theater regularly conduct cordon and search operations, but some detain few if any persons, while others detain in large numbers. Over two-thirds of the detention facilities across the COA had generated forms to document capture data; few if any units had standardized detention kits available to ensure a consistent approach to identifying evidence and recording data. Screening individuals initially detained is done on an ad hoc basis dependent on resources. Some units bring the screening resources to the scene; others take those detained with them to field detention facilities. While understanding conditions on the battlefield vary greatly from operation to operation and region to region, standardization can help ensure humane treatment and better intelligence collection. Additionally, when battlefield conditions permit, working and coordinating with Afghan officials enhances our ability to avoid conflict with cultural sensitivities, particularly concerning Afghan women and children.

b. Field detention facilities – there is no set structural standard for field detention sites. Some units use existing facilities where they can, while others build structures out of plywood or Hesco barriers. Consistent with CJTF-180 Detainee Handling Guidance, issued in February 2004 (Enclosure N), once transferred from the capture site, detainees should be housed in secured facilities that, as a minimum, have a living area big enough to stand up in and lay down without coming into contact with bare ground or another detainee, allows for direct sunlight to enter the confinement area, allows air to circulate into the cell area, provides overhead cover to prevent rain and snow from entering, and is located near a latrine. While some facilities were clearly better than others, only minor modifications needed to be made during the inspection to bring all facilities into
compliance with acceptable standards. Detention operations at this point in the process are an inherent part of combat operations. Regional commanders and component commanders must take full responsibility for the conduct of these operations.

c. — this facility was initially established using the EPW collection point standards in AR 190-8. While an outdoor facility, it provides for the basic needs of the detainees in a secure compound. As a temporary holding facility for detainees enroute to detainees may be required to stay in this facility for long periods of time – up to several months. Overcrowding conditions at Bagram during the

holding facility rather than a temporary collection point. Provisions have been made for ICRC access and detainee interviews at the end of June 2004, and further facility enhancements are being programmed (Enclosure 0).

the minimum necessities for the long-term detention of detainees. Structural upgrades are required and plans are in place to improve the security and structural integrity of the facility, and an expansion plan is in place to handle projected increases in the detainee population. Environmental studies have also been conducted, and a final assessment by the US Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventative Medicine (CHPPM) has

failed to progress (see Enclosure D, paragraph 11.e).

f. Other detainee inputs - at both forward operating bases and the Bagram detention facility, detainees are brought into the system from a variety of sources. For example,
forces (ISAF) stationed in Kabul. Guidance regarding these transfers is lacking, and detainees are often accepted from non-DOD sources without DOD approval. As they would when processing any detainee, CJTF-76 forces document the physical condition of transferred detainees at time of acceptance, but supporting documentation regarding these detainees is inconsistent. Given that all detainees in our custody will have the opportunity to tell their story to the ICRC, CJTF-76 will invariably be left trying to explain any allegations of abuse or maltreatment made by a transferred detainee with limited ability to produce evidence in response. CJTF-76 forces need to understand the criteria for accepting transfers and from whom transfers are authorized. Also, as Afghan institutions mature, alternatives to detention by US forces, like arrest by civil authorities, need to be fully considered.

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h. Command and control and process management – C² of the detainee operations process requires additional emphasis at all levels. At some locations substantial attention is required. For example, commanders at some locations had little or no involvement in detainee operations; others had security lapses or careless attitudes towards detainees. Those forward collection points that have designated a “warden,” a single point of contact who is in charge of these operations at the local collection point, are run well. Those that don't have issues. Clearly, a holistic approach to detainee operations, starting at the top, needs to be considered. Expertise to provide custodial care and oversight over detainees resides in the Reserve Component Interment and Resettlement (I/R) units. There are no I/R units in theater, nor individual assignees with confinement or detainee operations experience in the theater assigned to the appropriate positions to provide oversight of theater wide detainee operations or to give guidance, training and assistance.

If generally insufficient specific command oversight for individual detention facilities is forward operating bases from regional command levels, and no definitive designation of C² over detainee operations theater-wide. The relationship between the JIF and Bagram detention facility is good but not formalized.

i. Detainee movement within the theater - the transfer process is slow due to the lack of dedicated transportation assets. Designated ring supply flights are often interrupted by operations or weather conditions, and ground transportation is extremely limited by poor infrastructure and security concerns. Additional delay is also caused by the failure of capturing units to properly document and transfer capture data and evidence to the detention facility. This is caused by a lack of clear guidance from higher headquarters and poor quality control by the receiving facility to ensure all intelligence, information
Revised permanent guidance from CFC-A Headquarters is scheduled to be issued in the very near future. Whatever guidance CFC-A may issue, it is likely that rules for CJTF-76 with OCF or OGA, they may also create perceptions of abuse or, even worse, set conditions where abuse may be more likely to occur. For example, conventional forces may fail to stop use of abusive interrogation techniques by other forces when they don't know what standards apply and may resort to unauthorized techniques they observe other forces use under the misapprehension that they are authorized for general use.

1. Chain of custody – other than transfers between [blacked out], chain of custody processing is inconsistent and non-standard. There are inconsistent methods and a variety of forms, some locally produced, used to document chains of custody for detainees, detainee property (to include money), and documents. Capturing units and subsequent locations do not maintain copies, and accountability for valuables is erratic. This has caused issues later in the process when released or repatriated detainee
requests the return of property, and also makes claims for missing property difficult to adjudicate. Generally, units believe that the standard EPW tag is insufficient to properly

SECTION VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

21. Improving CFC-A AOR detainee operations will involve commitment of resources and effort along five primary lines of operation: forces, training, technology, facilities, and C^2 and management.

Forces

a. To properly conduct detainee operations throughout Afghanistan requires the right kinds of forces to bring the requisite expertise to the process. Military Police I/R units, Confinement units, and MP Guard companies if assigned, would provide the custodial care and expertise to run the two major collection facilities at Bagram and Kandahar, as well as assist the theater forward collection points with the proper guidance, training, and oversight to properly conduct detainee operations. Forces on the ground today do not
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d. Training in detainee operations as opposed to EPW operations is a relatively new concept for the Army. Units guarding detainees at all levels require the most current TTP excellent training package on detainee operations that could be sent to deploying units as an exportable training package to prepare them for detainee operations prior to deploying into theater.

e. There is a steep learning curve for incoming units during the first few months in theater concerning detainee operations. Predeployment training normally focuses on operations as much as possible. Appropriate command emphasis should be placed on training non-traditional tasks involved in detainee operations prior to deployment.

level. Large, unspecific cordon and search operations more often than not result in a might be hostile. This can clearly have a negative effect on the local populace. Whenever possible, participation and support of Afghan military or police forces and government officials should be sought. Additional detention training, to include profiling training, is required to maximize the effectiveness of cordon and search operations.
g. Troops in contact (TIC) is an event of high stress and emotion that may result in the detention of individuals. If a TIC results in detention, an opportunity for abuse arises as a result of the stress and emotion. There is a need for additional individual and collective pre-mobilization training that emphasizes doctrine, the 5 S’s (search, silence, segregate, safeguard and speed to the rear), and cultural sensitivity. This will allow those who come into initial contact with detainees to respond in accordance with their training vice emotion and stress. Leadership and supervision, in addition to training, are the keys to success in detainee handling at the point of capture.

h. Improved interrogation training leading to the certification of all interrogators will improve intelligence gathering and dissemination of actionable intelligence as well as improve the detainee screening process. Interrogators need training on Afghan culture, traditions and history to be able to get the most intelligence from detainees. Additionally, combat commanders at all levels need training on interrogation and detainee chain of custody to ensure that unit actions do not interfere with or negatively affect the interrogation of detainees. Recommend that each commander’s right seat ride include case studies on the interrogation process and how the capturing unit can best facilitate and positively impact the process.

Technology Support Requirements

j. All facilities in Afghanistan provide only the most basic security enhancements.

k. Communication capabilities must be improved. Secure network capabilities at

intelligence either forward or to the rear. Real time data transfer will improve the SECDEF criteria analysis conducted at points of capture, thus ensuring only individuals who are likely to meet the criteria are further processed.

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m. Access to US national databases at the unit level would be a very useful way to check whether those temporarily detained should be detained further, turned over to civilian authorities, or simply released.

n. Handheld metal detectors can discover hidden devices undiscoverable by an external search. Metal detectors can also negate a perceived need for more invasive physical examinations in exceptional cases. All facilities and units that handle detainees should be equipped with these proven devices.

p. At Transfer of Authority (TOA), no non-lethal equipment was available at the Bagram or Kandahar detention facilities. A full suite of non-lethal capability must be on hand at both facilities and available to regional commanders.
s. Minimal standards for field detention sites must be included in a revision to the Detention Operations SOP and distributed throughout the theater. These standards should include adequate room to lay down and stand up without touching the walls or ceiling, proper ventilation, sufficient lighting, both natural and/or artificial, protection from the elements, cover from attack, and adequate latrine facilities. Each detention site should also have a pre-established plan for segregating women and children from the men.

C. **Management**

t. Detainee operations should be a theater-wide focus, not one solely directed towards the detention facilities at Bagram or Kandahar. At the CJTF-76 level, the OIC of

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reports directly to the CJTF-76 CG. This organization will coordinate detainee operations directly with the Regional Brigade and Component Command Headquarters. Regional Brigade and Component Commanders should appoint commanders in their region responsible for the safeguarding and care of detainees while detained in collection points in their areas of operation. Base commanders should in turn appoint an OIC or NCOIC as the "warden," or single point of contact who is in charge of detainee operations at the local collection point. A clear mandate to operate the facility according to standards established by appropriate authorities and an unequivocal acceptance of command responsibility at these facilities will go a long way in preventing detainee abuse and maintaining standards.

u. As the theater matures, we have an opportunity to create corresponding improvements in our detention facilities and to better provide for the well being of detainees consistent with the principles of the Geneva Conventions. Particularly for Low Level Enemy
Combatants (LIECs), many of whom have already been detained in the Bagram Collection Point for extensive periods and who have little chance for release in the foreseeable future, alternative arrangements are worth evaluating. This may be a significant challenge in the short-term given significant detainee population increases, but future construction efforts at Bagram may provide an area separate from other detainees where more space to exercise, take instruction, and even work might be made available in the spirit of Geneva without hindering the intelligence gathering function.

SECTION VII. RECOMMENDED DIRECTIVES

22. Upon approval of the findings and recommendations, the Commanding General, CFC-A, should consider directing the following sections:
SECTION VIII. CONCLUSIONS

23. For incoming units of CJTF-76, this inspection occurred at the right time. The observations, findings, and recommendations of this inspection will serve as the basis for an action plan that will improve theater detainee operations throughout the detention process. While humane treatment of detainees is in fact the understood and practiced standard in the theater, lack of clarity regarding authorities, standards of detention, and standards of interrogation, provides for sufficient friction in the process to create opportunities for detainee abuse and impede effective intelligence collection and dissemination. While the current detainee system we observed is being executed in a
professional and diligent manner, and the current standard operating procedures had been updated in the last 90 days, the expanding scope and complexity of detainee operations, constant turnover of forces, the emerging role of the Afghan government, and the changing nature of the battlefield require a more rigorous process, better defined standards, and clearer authorities.

24. An action plan must now be developed based upon the approved recommendations of this inspection along the lines of operations of forces, training, technology, facility upgrades, and C2 and management. Improvements can be made that will reduce the risk of detainee abuse and enhance mission accomplishment. Many of the key components of a revised system are already in development and are listed in the annexes to this report.

25. While this inspection revealed no systematic or widespread mistreatment of detainees, opportunities for mistreatment, our commitment to keep faith with the American and Afghan people, the fact of ongoing investigations, and a maturing battlefield urge for modifications to the current detainee operations process. On the emerging counter-insurgency battlefield of Afghanistan, creating the security environment needed to rebuild Afghanistan and enable Afghan government institutions requires detainee operations that both garner and disseminate useful intelligence and recognize the centrality of the Afghan people in the struggle to create a stable Afghanistan. In this view, mistreatment of detainees anywhere in the process works directly contrary to US and Afghan national objectives.

26. US detainee operations can only be normalized by the emergence of an Afghan justice and corrections system that can assume the responsibility for the long-term detention of low level enemy combatants currently held by the US. The detention process is fundamentally designed for intelligence collection purposes. To that end, tactical commanders continue to place great value on intelligence derived from battlefield questioning and screening. At the operational level, and to a lesser degree the strategic level, detainees are of important intelligence value. The value of continuing to keep low-level enemy combatants in custody is simply to keep individuals that represent a proven threat to coalition forces off the battlefield. This is a function that can and should be undertaken by the Afghan government. With detainee input to the system coming from multiple US agencies across Afghanistan, the detention challenge will grow over time. Despite efforts to improve the process, the press of a growing detainee population without an Afghan solution or continued transfer to GTMO will continue to create the potential for bad choices to be made at several points in that process.

27. CJTF-76 has committed itself as an organization to the short and long term actions required to improve detainee operations across the CJOA. In addition to initiatives that improve the effectiveness and efficiency of detainee operations, CJTF-76 will consider
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options that better provide for the well being of detainees. Humane treatment must continue to be understood and practiced as the unequivocal standard for the conduct of detainee operations that protect the force and detainees, produce effective intelligence, and keep faith with the US and Afghan people.
# REPORT OF INSPECTION

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MEMORANDUM FOR BG JACOBY, DCG, CJTF-76

SUBJECT: Appointment Order - Top to Bottom Review of CFC-A AOR Detainee Operations

1. At the direction of the Commander, CFC-A, I am appointing you to lead a top to bottom review of CFC-A AOR detainee operations. As you determine necessary, you are free to detail members of the CJTF-76 staff to support this investigation and conduct collateral reviews and evaluations. Further, all previous and contemporaneous inspections and investigations of detainee operations conducted in this theater are available for your review.

2. You will review and evaluate detainee operations in CJTF-76 AOR to ensure compliance with current operational guidance and DOD and Army regulations for the safeguarding of detainees. Specifically, you will address focus areas articulated in FRAGO 48 to CFC OPORD 04-03 by evaluating the following lines of operation and supporting tasks.

a. Requests for forces - address the requirements for command and control over all levels of detainee operations to specifically include BCP and JIP operations; contractor support or special assessment teams to provide technical expertise in the area of prison security and detainee mental health and well-being; and future (OFF 6 and beyond) staffing requirements for guard companies, a detainee operations HHD, and MP confinement specialists.

b. Requests for training - identify requirements for MTTs that can define and provide training for detainee guards, ASOTs/first echelon tactical questioning, and interrogator certification.

c. Technology support - identify technology requirements to support security and interrogation operations across the CJGA.

d. Facility upgrades - define requirements for different echelons of theater detainee operations facilities including field detention points (spokes), area collection/initial interrogation points (hub), the Bagram theater collection point, and long-term Afghan detention facilities.

3. As part of your inspection, you will conduct weekly JPRs and provide progress reports through me to the CFC-A CDR NLT every Wednesday, 1300Z. Your complete assessment should be finalized for my review NLT 15 June 2004, and should include the following outputs:

a. Recommendations, both specific and general, for immediate to long-term modifications/changes to theater detainee operations.
CJTF-76-CG
SUBJECT: Appointment Order - Top to Bottom Review of CFC-A AOR Detainee Operations

b. Identification of best practices in all detainee operations functional areas.

c. Listing of corrective actions taken with regard to detainee operations and reporting procedures during the course of your investigation.

d. Suggestions with regard to future command efforts and initiatives necessary to monitor detainee operations in an effort to ensure enduring adherence to operational and regulatory guidance.

4. Questions regarding this appointment, or requests for additional time to complete this investigation, should be coordinated directly with me.

ERIC T. OLSON
MG, USA
Commanding
180945Z MAY 04
FROM COMCFC-A
TO COMCJTTF76 BAGRAM AFG//IG//
COR COMC-A//
RUEHCL/AMBASSAD KABUL AF//
RUEHCL/AMBASSAD ISLAMABD PK//
S E C R E T / N O F O R H
OPER/ENDURING FREEDOM//
MSGID/GENADMIN/COMCJTTF76 BAGRAM AFG//IG//
SUBJ/FRAGO 48 TO CFC OPORD 04-05 COMCFC-A ASSESSMENT OF DETAINEE OPERATIONS

1. (U) SITUATION. NO CHANGE.

1A. (U) ENEMY. NO CHANGE.

1B. (U) FRIENDLY. NO CHANGE.

2. (U) MISSION. NO CHANGE.

3. (U) EXECUTION.

3A. (U) CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION. CTF-76 WILL CONDUCT A SPECIAL INSPECTION OF DETAINEE OPERATIONS. THE PURPOSE IS TO REVIEW AND EVALUATE UNIT DETAINEE OPERATIONS IN CFC-A AOR TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH DOD AND ARMY REGULATIONS FOR THE SAFEGUARDING OF THE DETAINES.

3B. TASKS TO CTF-76.

3B.1. ASSIGN A GENERAL OFFICER TO LEAD AN INSPECTION TEAM TO PERFORM A TOP-TO-BOTTOM REVIEW OF ALL DETAINEE FACILITIES AND OPERATIONS IN THE CFC-A C20A.

3B.1A. ASSESSMENT WILL INCLUDE CTF 76, CJSTF, AND OCF DETAINEE OPERATIONS AND FACILITIES.

3B.1B. (U) REVIEW AND ASSESS COMMAND AND CONTROL (OPORDS, SOPS, TRAINING) AND TECHNIQUES, TACTICS AND PROCEDURES (TTP) USED IN DETENTION OPERATIONS AND PROVIDE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REVISIONS, MODIFICATIONS, OR SUSTAINMENT.

3B.1C. (U) ASSESS MEDICAL TREATMENT PROVIDED TO DETAINES.

3B.1D. (U) EVALUATE CONFORMITY TO INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC) STANDARDS OF COMPLIANCE.

3B.1E. (U) REVIEW AND ASSESS FORWARD OPERATING BASE COLLECTION AREA PROCEDURES.

3B.1F. (U) REVIEW AND ASSESS SOLDIER SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS AND DETENTION FACILITY GUARD ORDERS.

3B.1G. (U) EVALUATE COMPLIANCE WITH 95 RECOGNIZED STANDARDS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW.

3B.1H. (U) APPLY IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION AND REPORT CRITICAL PROBLEM AREAS WHEN DISCOVERED.

3B.1I. (U) DEVELOP BEST PRACTICES FOR CONDUCTING DETENTION OPERATIONS.

3B.1J. (U) DEVELOP BASELINE REQUIREMENTS AND STANDARDS FOR MAINTAINING, MAINTAINING, AND OPERATING DETENTION FACILITIES.

3B.1K. (U) PROVIDE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NUMBERS AND LOCATIONS OF FACILITIES.

3B.2 (U) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

3B.2A. (U) CONDUCT WEEKLY EPAS AND PROVIDE PROGRESS REPORT TO CFC-A/CJ2 NL 2 EVERY WED, 1300.

3B.2B. (U) TIMELINE: COMPLETE ASSESSMENT AND PROVIDE ALL RECOMMENDATIONS TO COMCFC-A NL 15 JUNE 04.

4. (U) SERVICE SUPPORT. NO CHANGE.

5. (U) COMMAND AND SIGNAL. NO CHANGE.

6. (U) FSC IS UNNUMBERED, CFC-CJ BATTLE MAJOR

7. (U) ACKNOWLEDGE.

(SECRATOR)
Encl A - Frago 48
3. Enemy combatant (EC) - any person that the US or Allied forces could properly detain under the laws and customs of war. For purposes of this conflict, an EC includes, but is not limited to, a member or agent of al Qaeda, the Taliban, or another international terrorist organization against which the US is engaged in armed conflict. The term enemy combatant does not confer enemy prisoner of war status on persons taken into custody by US forces in the USCENTCOM AOR pursuant to the global war on terrorism. The term "enemy combatant" is broad enough to encompass all individuals who are of custodial interest to the United States but who may not ultimately meet the SECDEF guidance for transfer to GTMO.

4. Detainees - persons who have been screened and have completed in processing who no longer meet criteria for and who meet the criteria for detention will be categorized as there is no ambiguous status
6. Under DoD Control - when an individual is either in the physical control of DoD, or, if in the physical control of another agency, has been designated by the President or his designee for transfer to DoD control.

8. Release - the process by which an individual, who has been determined no longer to pose a threat to the US or US interests, is released to a foreign government with no promise, in return, for continued detention.

9. Conditional release - the release of an EC who has been determined no longer to pose a threat to the US or US interests, under a promise or agreement of that EC not to take up arms, or participate in further fighting, against the US or its allies in exchange for freedom.
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: CJTF-180 Detainee Operations Standard Operating Procedures

1. (U) Purpose. To provide guidance regarding detention criteria, handling, treatment, detainment, and intelligence gathering process for persons under control (PUCs) in the Combined Joint Operations Area (CJOA) from their capture to release/transfer to Guantanamo Bay (GTMO).

2. (U) References.
   b. (U) USCENTCOM, 090138Z Dec 01, FRAGO 02-029 Detainee Handling Procedures, Operation Enduring Freedom, Secret/NOFORN.
   c. (U) CJCS, 082315Z Jan 02, Implementing Guidance on Detainee Screening and Processing for Transfers to Guantanamo Bay Naval Base (GTMO), Secret/NOFORN.
   d. (U) CJCS, 101519Z Jan 02, Rules of Engagement (ROE) Serial One for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) Detainee Operations, Confidential.
   e. (U) USCENTCOM, 240701Z Jan 02, USCINCENT Guidance for Detainee Handling, Operation Enduring Freedom, Secret/NOFORN.
   f. (U) USCENTCOM, 251314Z Feb 02, CFC Detainee Operations Guidance, Secret/NOFORN.
   g. (U) CJCS, 171400Z Apr 02, Policy and Guidelines for Transfers of Detainees to Foreign Government Control, Secret/NOFORN.
   h. (U) USCENTCOM, 19 Apr 02, Memorandum, Subject: Detainee Release and Transfer Policy, Secret/NOFORN.
   i. (U) SECDEF, 101700Z Jun 02, Supplemental Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) on Detainees, Secret/NOFORN.

Enclosure: 1
CJTF-180-SJA
SUBJECT: CJTF-180 Detainee Operations Standard Operating Procedures

j. (U) USCENTCOM, 061317Z Oct 02, Detainee Visitation Approval Procedures, Operation Enduring Freedom, Secret/NOFORN.

k. (U) CJCS, 091425Z Jan 03, Modification 1 to SECDEF Implementing Guidance on Detainee Screening and Processing for Transfers of Detainees in Afghanistan, to Guantanamo Bay Naval Base (GTMO), Secret/NOFORN.

l. (U) CJCS, 181655Z Jan 03, implementing Guidance for Release or Transfer of Detainees Under U.S. Department of Defense Control to Foreign Government Control, Secret/NOFORN.

m. (U) USCENTCOM, 101437Z Feb 03, Clarification Message to Modification 1 to SECDEF Implementing Guidance on Detainee Screening and Processing for Transfers of Detainees in Afghanistan, to Guantanamo Bay Naval Base (GTMO), Secret/NOFORN.

n. (U) CJTF180, FRAGO 6 to OPORD 01-02, 040400ZJUN02, Secret/NOFORN.

o. (U) CJTF180, CJTF180 Detainee Handling Guidance, 261800ZFEB04, Unclassified.


q. (U) USCENTCOM, 102133Z Jul 02, USCENTCOM Delegation of Authority to Release Persons Under U.S. Control Who Do Not Meet SECDEF Detention Criteria, Secret/NOFORN.

r. (U) SECDEF, 21 April 2003, Memorandum, Low-Level Enemy Combatants, Secret/NOFORN.

s. (U) CJCS, 082315Z Jan 02, Implementing Guidance on Detainee Screening and Processing for Transfers to Guantanamo Bay Naval Base (GTMO), Secret/NOFORN.

l. (U) CJCS, 040002Z APR 03, Standing EXORD on Detainee Transfers, Operation Enduring Freedom, Secret/NOFORN.

u. (U) CJTF-180 Authorized Interrogation Approaches and Strategies, 18 March 2004, Secret/NOFORN.

3. (S/NF) Detention Criteria

2. SEGREGATION

DOD JUNE 973
SUBJECT: CJTF-180 Detainee Operations Standard Operating Procedures

b. (U) Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, states that persons who are out of combat due to detention (captured) shall in all cases be treated humanely. (Reference P) In addition, the following acts are prohibited with respect to detained persons:

1) (U) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture.
CJTF-180-SJA
SUBJECT: CJTF-180 Detainee Operations Standard Operating Procedures

2) (U) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment.

c. (U) CJTF180 Detainee Handling Guidance (Reference O) provides the following:

1) (U) All personnel or units assigned, attached, OPCON, or TACON to CJTF180 will, under all circumstances, treat PUCs humanely and to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity and security requirements, in a manner consistent with the principles of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Under no circumstances will PUCs be subjected to humiliating or degrading treatment.

2) (U) Once transferred from the capture site, PUCs will be:

a) (U) Provided reasonable protection from the environment by placing them in interior holding areas or providing overhead protection from the sun and rain.

b) (U) Placed on a floor or other form of barrier material to protect them from the ground.

c) (U) Provided blankets, clothing, foot covering, or other similar items as needed to protect them from the elements.

d) (U) If sensory deprivation is required, provided darkened goggles and/or ear muffs – NOT hoods, burlap sacks, or sandbags.

e) (U) Allowed to exercise basic personal hygiene and be given adequate access to latrine facilities.

f) (U) Provided opportunities for prayer.

g) (U) Provided adequate food and water on a regular basis.

h) (U) Provided medical attention.

3) (U) Units whose missions may require them to capture PUCs will obtain and stock supplies to meet the above standards at all initial holding sites. Units that unexpectedly capture PUCs will obtain these supplies as soon as possible after capture.

4) (U) The detaining unit will document compliance with paragraph 2 above for each PUC detained. A DA Form 1594 Journal is an appropriate tool to track PUC handling.

5) (U) Once a PUC is in the custody of CJTF180 personnel, the above
CJTF-180-SJA
SUBJECT: CJTF-180 Detainee Operations Standard Operating Procedures

standards will apply regardless of the capturing organization or the organization conducting the interrogation.

6) (U) If another organization requests, or in any way attempts to have CJTF-180 personnel violate any of the above standards, such requests or attempts will immediately be reported to HQ, CJTF-180.

d. (U) Protection from Harm. Defense of detainees from harm by third parties is required. (LAW References D and F)
7. (S/NF) Status of Detained Persons. There are several major labels that might be given to a person detained by the United States. These labels include the following:

- b.1
- 1.4(a)
- b.1
- 1.4(c)
- b.1
- 1.4(c)
- b.1
- 1.4(c)
process. The ISN is ultimately maintained by the National Detainee Reporting Center (NDRC), which in theory provides the ICRC the list that gives them visibility of persons currently being held by the U.S. The CJTF180 PMO Detainee Ops Section issues the ISN. Prior to issuing the ISN, the PMO gives notice to all interested parties.

8. (S/NF) Interrogation Techniques. All techniques can be found in Field Manual (FM) 34-52.
SUBJECT: CJTF-180 Detainee Operations Standard Operating Procedures
10. (S/NF) Rules for the Use of Force (RUF)

   a. (U) Nothing in these rules limits a commander's inherent authority and
      obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate action in self-
      defense of the commander's unit or other U.S. forces in the vicinity.

   b. (U) When the use of force is necessary, guards shall use the minimum amount
      of force necessary to maintain discipline and compliance with detention facility rules.
      Such use of force will be proportional in that it should be reasonable in intensity, duration,
      and magnitude based on all facts known at the time.

   c. (U) Warning shots are not authorized.

   d. (U) Use of riot control agents is authorized as a riot control measure to protect
      and control detainees.

   e. (U) Defense of detainees from harm by third parties is required.

   f. (U) Circumstances permitting, the following options will be considered when
      determining the appropriate amount of force used:

      1) (U) verbal persuasion.

      2) (U) unarmed defense techniques.
3) (U) chemical aerosol irritant projectors.
4) (U) MP/riot control club.
5) (U) Tazers
6) (U) military working dogs.
7) (U) presentation of deadly force capability.
8) (U) deadly force.

g. (U) Deadly force is justified only under conditions of extreme necessity when:

1) (U) lesser means have been exhausted, are unavailable, or cannot reasonably be employed; and

2) (U) the risk of death or serious bodily injury to innocent persons is not significantly increased by use; and the purpose of its use is one or both of the following:

a) (U) when deadly force appears necessary to protect U.S. forces who reasonably believe themselves or others to be in imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm by the hostile detainee(s); or

b) (U) when deadly force appears necessary to prevent the escape of detainees/PUCs.

3) (U) The detention facility commander must ensure that each detainee understands the meaning of the English word "halt." In the event of an escape attempt, apply the following rules for the use of force:

a) (U) Shout "halt" three (3) times. Thereafter,

b) (U) Use least amount of force necessary to halt detainee.

c) (U) If there is no other effective means of preventing escape, deadly force may be used.
CJTF-180-SJA
SUBJECT: CJTF-180 Detainee Operations Standard Operating Procedures

b. 1
1.4(a)c.

b. 1
1.4(a)c.

13. (S/NF)

b. 1
1.4(a)

b. 1
1.4(a)

15
SECRET/NOFORN

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2) Non-Governmental Agencies (NGO). The ICRC observes the
repatriation and logs each person who returns from GTMO. The ICRC also provides
each detainee with traditional clothing that they can wear once released from U.S.
custody. UNICEF will be involved when minors are being repatriated.

- ICRC Liaison. Each facility conducting detainees operations will appoint an
  ICRC Liaison. (Reference N) By doctrine, the ICRC liaison is a Judge Advocate. The
  ICRC is the only agency outside of the U.S. government authorized access to
  FOUs and detainees. (See
  References F and N1)
CJTF-180-SJA
SUBJECT: CJTF-180 Detainee Operations Standard Operating Procedures

Advocate. The ICRC liaison for Kandahar, if necessary, is the maneuver task force trial counsel.

b. Frequency of Visits. Pursuant to international law, the duration and frequency of visits shall not be limited. (Reference N) However, the Judge Advocate liaison and the ICRC may coordinate for mutually convenient times for visits, as operational needs dictate. The ICRC typically visits every seven to ten days, and the visits typically last from one to three days. The frequency and duration of the visits is set by the ICRC depending on the number of PUCs and detainees as well as the availability of ICRC Interpreters.
CJTF-180-SJA
SUBJECT: CJTF-180 Detainee Operations Standard Operating Procedures
CJTF-180-SJA
SUBJECT: CJTF-180 Detainee Operations Standard Operating Procedures

b. Interim meetings/sessions. There are occasions when the ICRC will visit Bagram between regularly scheduled visits. Examples of such occasions include:

1) Detainee deaths

4) Eid holiday (to deliver food)

5) Meetings with the SJA or CG

6) 

f. There are occasions when the ICRC liaison will visit the ICRC outside of Bagram. Examples of such occasions include:

1) Delivery of remains to families (outlying provinces)

2) ICRC Mine Action Center, Kabul

3) ICRC Prosthetic Clinic, Kabul

g. Letters from the ICRC. The ICRC will occasionally send letters to CJTF180 concerning detainee operations issues. Typically, these letters are addressed from the Head of the Afghanistan Delegation to the Commanding General of CJTF180. Examples of such letters include:

20
SECRET/NOFORN


CJTF-180-SJA
SUBJECT: CJTF-180 Detainee Operations Standard Operating Procedures

1) The 6-month Review. This letter provides a comprehensive review of
   detainee issues that arose over the past six months.

2) Interim letters.
   a) Dec 02 – concerns over detainee deaths
   b) Jan 02 – request for location of detainees alleged to be in U.S. custody
   c) Mar 03 – allegations of mistreatment at safe houses
   d) Request for access to HVTs.

3) JCS/CENTCOM Letters. Occasionally, the ICRC will send a letter to
   D.C. CJTF180 will assist CENTCOM and JCS legal in response to ICRC inquiries
   directed to D.C.

15. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at [blank].

Encl

LTC, JA
Staff Judge Advocate

LTC, MI
Director of Intelligence

Task Force Guardian Commander

21
SECRET/NOFORN
SUBJECT: Background Information on All Facilities and Sites Held by DOD in Afghanistan Since January 2001

1. (U) Purpose. To give an understanding of the locations of all detention sites held by DOD in Afghanistan since January 2001.

2. (U) Facts.
   a. (U) Since January 20, 2001, Combined Joint Task Force 76 (previously CJTF-180) has used 19 separate temporary facilities to hold Person Under U.S. Control (PUCs) and one semi-permanent facility to hold PUCs, Low Level Enemy Combatants (LLECs) and Enemy Combatants (EC) awaiting transfer to Guantanamo Bay.
   b. (U) have also been held at
   c. (U) initially these field detention sites were limited to a simple structure of concertina wire and tarping for protection from the elements. Over time, some of the more active facilities have been improved to provide better security and afford better treatment and protection from the elements for the held there. However, for the majority, these
are temporary structures that are erected or dismantled depending on battlefield requirements.
Enclosure F

Exemption – Public Document
13. (U) USCENTCOM, 101437Z Feb 03, Clarification Message to Modification 1 to SECDEF Implementing Guidance on Detainee Screening and Processing for Transfers of Detainees in Afghanistan, to Guantanamo Bay Naval Base (GTMO), Secret//NOFORN.

14. (U) CJTF180, FRAGO 6 to OORD 01-02, 040400ZJUN02, Secret//NOFORN.

15. (U) CJTF180, CJTF180 Detainee Handling Guidance, 251800FEB04, Unclassified.


17. (U) USCENTCOM, 102133Z Jul 02, USCINCENCENT Delegation of Authority to Release Persons Under U.S. Control Who Do Not Meet SECDEF Detention Criteria, Secret//NOFORN.

18. (U) SECDEF, 21 April 2003, Memorandum, Low-Level Enemy Combatants, Secret//NOFORN.

19. (U) CJCS, 082315Z Jan 02, Implementing Guidance on Detainee Transfers, Operation Enduring Freedom, Secret//NOFORN.

20. (U) CJCS, 040002Z APR 03, Standing EXORD on Detainee Transfers, Operation Enduring Freedom, Secret//NOFORN.

21. (U) CJTF-180 Authorized Interrogation Approaches and Strategies, 16 March 2004, Secret//NOFORN.

Enc G - References
Information Paper

SUBJECT: SECDEF Detention Criteria

Encl 1 - SECDEF Screening Criteria Info Paper
Enclosure J

Exemption – B1
From: Colonel [redacted] Commanding Officer, CTF Stonewall
To: Battalion Commanders and Provincial Reconstruction Team Commanders
Subj: Handling of Persons Under Control (PUCs)
Ref: (a) Recent press releases from Iraq on the mistreatment of PUCs

1. Commanders, following is my guidance for the handling of PUCs:
   a. We will continue to treat all PUCs professionally within the guidelines of CJTF 180 directives and the Geneva Convention.
   b. We will not dishonor the American military through the mistreatment of PUCs.
   c. We cannot and will not allow any of our personnel to compromise himself or herself or CTF Stonewall by mistreating PUCs.
   d. We will not stand idly by if we witness mistreatment of PUCs by other American or Coalition Forces.
   e. Any mistreatment of PUCs must be reported via the chain of command or directly to the Stonewall COC and SIA.
   f. We cannot afford to be distracted from our mission by an incident involving inhumane or humiliating treatment of PUCs.

2. Therefore, review CJTF 180 FRAGO 274 regarding the handling of PUCs in this AO.
   a. Stonewall forces have a duty and an obligation under applicable international law to ensure that persons captured or detained by US forces are treated humanely and not subject to torture or cruel, humiliating, or degrading treatment.
   b. Detainees will be provided reasonable protection from the elements by placing them in interior holding areas or providing overhead protection from the sun and rain.
   c. They will be provided medical attention, food, water, blankets, clothing and foot coverings to protect them from the elements.
   d. If sensory deprivation is required, provide blindfolds or darkened goggles, earmuffs or earplugs.
   e. Hoods, sandbags, burlap sacks are not authorized at field holding sites or during later movement to another PUC facility.
   f. PUCs will be allowed to practice basic hygiene and given adequate access to latrine facilities and time for prayer.
   g. Interrogations will be conducted in accordance with DoD guidelines.

3. I expect each unit to plan ahead and have on hand sufficient supplies to provide for PUCs basic needs.
   a. It should not come as a surprise to us after operating in this AO that many PUCs will require certain items such as blankets, clothing, etc. in order to comply with this guidance.
   b. As professionals, we must plan ahead for these actions. If you need support, my staff stands ready to assist you.
   c. Nothing speaks louder than daily Professional Military Conduct in the execution of all our duties!

Encl K - Example Commander's Guidance
DEFINITIONS

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Example of a Capture Tag

Capture TAG

Front Side

- ATTACH THE TAG TO THE PVC SO WE CAN SORT THEM OUT AT THE HOLDING AREA.

How & When is Definition of Capture. They will add these numbers to your lab and will also be in later, if PVC won't answer then last another anywhere.

When and how captured. This is the most important part of the tag. The content of capture is used to determine steps of model and reconstruction and later if the PVC should be released. They will be in later. Two PVCs that were captured because they were moving fast, later contained they were captured with propelling and "dashing" step.

Who Identified this. So we know who is responsible to get more information when they see it.

When he captured with speed, so we know we can see whether be captured with so and can say against this. This was in last two with the propelling and the propelling in looks for the propelling. PVC and "dashing" is to look for this other way. We can capture with the PVC. The PVC is also for tagging this small, otherwise we will have no idea to sort it out or move globally.

UNCLASSIFIED (FOUO when filled in)

SECRET/FOUO

DOD JUNE 1005
Enclosure O

Exemption –
B3 10 USC 130c
Enclosure P

Exemption – B5
MEMORANDUM FOR SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: CJTF-180 Authorized Interrogation Approaches and Strategies

1. Purpose. The purpose of this document is to identify approved interrogation techniques and strategies to be used at Battlefield Interrogation sites throughout the CJTF-180 AOR and at the Joint Interrogation Facility located in Bagram, Afghanistan.

2. References.
   c. Counter Resistance Techniques in the War on Terrorism, dated 16 April 03.

4. Battlefield Interrogation (BI)

   b. 1
   1.4((a)(c)(g))

   b. 1
   1.4((a)(c))

SECRET/NOFORN
Enclosure Q

Attachment

Exemption B1
Enclosure R

Exemption – B5
Change 1, FRAGO 24 (Interrogation Guidance) to OPORD 04-007 (AGHAN EYES)

1. SITUATION:
   A. Friendly: No Change.

2. MISSION: No Change.

3. EXECUTION: No Change.

Commanders Intent: All units in 125th MI BN will strictly adhere to the following interrogation guidance and approved techniques. Techniques not explicitly described in this order will not be used without express approval from the Commander-125th MI BN and Commander-CJTF76.

A. Tasks to Subordinate Units.
   1. Only qualified school-trained interrogators will conduct interrogations. Interrogations will only take place inside of the controlled environment of CJTF76 approved interrogation facilities.
B. Coordinating Instructions. No Change.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT: No Change.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL: No Change.
APPENDIX A (Tactical Questioning Procedures and Requirements) to FRAGO 24
(Interrogation Guidance)

1. SCOPE: (U) The following techniques are approved for non-interrogation trained personnel. It is important to note that improper, unlawful, or inept attempts at field exploitation can harm or destroy potential critical intelligence sources, and send US soldiers to prison. Any decision to attempt these procedures is a command responsibility.

2. DEFINITION: Tactical questioning is the effort to obtain combat information of immediate use to the battalion or subordinate unit by a senior intelligence professional. It is important to note that tactical questioning is not an interrogation.

3. PURPOSE:

4. Tactical Questioning (TQ).

c. (U) PUCs are medically screened and provided necessities IAW with the Geneva Convention, i.e. food and water.
APPENDIX B (Interrogation Procedures and Requirements) to FRAGO 24 (Interrogation Guidance)

1. SCOPE: (U) The following techniques are approved for interrogation. It is important to note that improper, unlawful, or inept attempts at field exploitation can harm or destroy potential critical intelligence sources, and send US Soldiers to prison. Any decision to attempt these procedures is a command responsibility.

2. DEFINITION: (S//REL GCTF) interrogations are conducted by trained interrogators in an attempt to elicit specific intelligence information.

3. INTERROGATIONS:

   a. (S//NF) Safeguards. Interrogation techniques are subject to the following safeguards:
APPENDIX C (Joint Interrogation Facility (JIF) Interrogations Procedures and Requirements) to FRAGO 24 (Interrogation Guidance)

1. SCOPE: (U) The following techniques are approved for interrogation trained personnel assigned to the Joint Interrogation Facility, Bagram, Afghanistan. It is important to note that improper, unlawful, or inept attempts at exploitation can harm or destroy potential critical intelligence sources, and send US Soldiers to prison. Any decision to attempt these procedures is a command responsibility.

3. PURPOSE:

   a. To conduct tactical and strategic interrogations based on the intelligence requirements and specific guidance from the CJ2.

4. JIF INTERROGATIONS:

   a. (S/NF) Safeguards. Interrogation techniques are subject to the following safeguards.
(6) The following are the only approach strategies approved for use in the Joint Interrogation Facility (JIF) by trained interrogation personnel only:

- b.1
- 1.4(A)c
- b.2(A)c
- b.2(A)c
- b.2(A)c
- b.2(A)c
- b.2(A)c
\[ b.1 \\
1.4(aXc) \\
b.2(\text{HIGH}) \]
MEMORANDUM FOR

C2, Combined Joint Task Force Seven, Baghdad, Iraq 09335
C3, Combined Joint Task Force Seven, Baghdad, Iraq 09335
Commander, 304th Military Intelligence Brigade, Baghdad, Iraq 09335
Commanders, Major Subordinate Commands

SUBJECT: CTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy

1. (SECRET) This memorandum establishes the interrogation and counter-resistance policy for all security internees under the control of any units under the command and control of CTF-7 and successor organizations, to include the MNF-I. Security internees are civilians who are detained pursuant to Articles 5 and 78 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949 (hereinafter Geneva Convention).

2. (SECRET) I approve the use of specified interrogation and counter-resistance approaches as described in Enclosure 1, relating to security internees, subject to the following:

   a. (SECRET) Use of these approaches is limited to interrogations of security internees under the control of CTF-7.

   b. (SECRET) These approaches must be used in combination with the safeguards described in Enclosure 2.
CITF7-CG

SUBJECT: CITF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy

In employing each of the authorized approaches, the interrogator must maintain control of the interrogation. The interrogator should appear to be the one who control all aspects of the interrogation, to include the lighting, heating and configuration of the interrogation room, as well as the food, clothing and shelter given to the security internee.

Requests for use of approaches not listed in Enclosure 1 will be submitted to me through CITF-7 C2, and will include a description of the proposed approach and recommended safeguards. A legal review from the CITF-7 JIA will accompany each request. Under no circumstances will the following interrogation techniques be approved or utilized: Sleep management; stress positions; change of scenery; diet manipulation; environment manipulation or sensory deprivation.

Nothing in this policy limits existing authority for maintenance of good order and discipline among persons under Coalition control.

This policy supersedes the CITF—7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy signed on 13 October 2003.

POC is MA DNV DSN

2 Enclos
1. Interrogation Approaches (SI)
2. General Safeguards

CP: Commander, US Central Command
GENERAL SAFEGUARDS

Application of these interrogation approaches is subject to the following general safeguards:

(i) limited to use by specifically trained interrogation personnel; (ii) there is a reasonable basis to believe that the security interest possesses information of intelligence value; (iii) the security interest is medically evaluated as a suitable candidate for interrogation (considering all approaches to be used in combination); (iv) a specific interrogation plan, including reasonable safeguards, limits on duration, intervals between applications, termination criteria, and the presence or availability of qualified medical personnel has been developed; and (v) there is appropriate supervision.

(U) The purpose of all interviews and interrogations is to get the most information from a security interest with the least intrusive method, applied in a humane and lawful manner with sufficient oversight by trained investigators or interrogators. Interrogators and supervisory personnel will ensure uniform, careful, and safe conduct of interrogations.

(NAVY) Interrogations must always be planned, deliberate actions that take into account factors such as the security interest's current and past performance in both detention and interrogation; a security interest's emotional and physical strengths and weaknesses; assessment of approaches and individual techniques that may be effective; strengths and weaknesses of interrogators; and factors which may necessitate the augmentation of personnel.

(SNAP) Interrogation approaches are designed to manipulate the security interest's emotions and weaknesses to gain his willing cooperation. Interrogation operations are never conducted in a vacuum; they are conducted in close cooperation with the detaining units. Detention regulations and policies established by detaining units should be harmonized to ensure consistency with the interrogation policies of the intelligence collection unit. Such consistency will help to maximize the credibility of the interrogation team and the effectiveness of the interrogation. Strict adherence to such regulations, policies and standard operating procedures is essential.

(NAVY) Interrogations must appear to completely control the interrogation environment. It is important that interrogators be provided reasonable latitude to vary approaches depending on the security interest's cultural background, strengths, weaknesses, environment, extent of resistance training, as well as the urgency with which information believed in the possession of the security interest must be obtained.

(SNAP) Interrogators must ensure the safety of security interests, and approaches must in no way endanger them. Interrogators will ensure that security interests are allowed adequate sleep and that diets provide adequate food and water and cause no adverse medical or cultural effects. Where segregation is necessary, security interests must be monitored for adverse medical or psychological reactions. Should military working dogs be present during interrogations, they will be muzzled and under control of a handler at all times to ensure safety.
While approaches are considered individually within this analysis, it must be understood that in practice, approaches are usually used in combination. The title of a particular approach is not always fully descriptive of a particular approach. The cumulative effect of all approaches to be employed must be considered before any decision is made regarding approval of a particular interrogation plan.
13. (U) POCs are MAJ [REDACTED]/CJTFO6 DPN, CJTF76 PNO

DPN/CJTFO6.CENTCOM.SHL.MIL. DSN: [REDACTED]/OR DSN: [REDACTED]

(SECURE) OR L2C [REDACTED]/CJTFO6 CH, CURRENT OPERATIONS, CJTF76

CHOPS@CJTFO6.CENTCOM.SHL.MIL DSN [REDACTED]

DECL: 03 JUN 04

BT

DRV TN: NSA/CSSM 123-2
Dated: 03 JUN 04
DECL ON: 03 JUN 04

Encl V - Request for Interrogators
SECRET/NONOFFICIAL

FM CJTF180/PHQ//CJ3//
THRU CFC-A//CJ3 //
INTO USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ3/CAT//CCJ3-2F//
CONCFCC DOHA KUWAIT KU//
CDR USAMPS FT LEONARD WOOD NO//
TO DA WASHINGTON DC//DAP//
CONCFCC FT MCPHERSON GA//AFRD-DT/WATCH//

OPE/ENDURING FREEDOM//
MSGID/GENADMIN//CONCF180 BAGRAM AFG//CJ3//
RE: STAFF ASSISTANCE VISIT (SAV) FROM THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL OFFICE TO ASSESS THE INTERNAL OPERATIONS OF THE DETAINEE DETENTION FACILITIES IN THE OEF-A CJQA.

1. (S) REQUEST A STAFF ASSISTANCE VISIT (SAV) FROM THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL OFFICE TO ASSESS THE INTERNAL OPERATIONS OF THE DETAINEE DETENTION FACILITIES IN THE OEF-A CJQA. ASSESSMENT WILL INCLUDE FACILITIES AT BAGRAM, KANDAHAR, AND FORWARD OPERATING BASES (FOB) HOLDING AREAS. ASSESSMENT SHOULD FOCUS ON INTERNAL DETENTION FACILITY OPERATIONS AND STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF EXISTING FACILITIES. TO INCLUDE A REVIEW OF PLANS FOR FUTURE DETAINEE DETENTION FACILITIES.

ASSSESSMENT TEAM SHOULD ALSO REVIEW THEATER WIDE DETAINEE OPERATIONS AND ADVISE CJTF-180 ON RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO BETTER STREAMLINE DETAINEE OPERATIONS THROUGHOUT THE OEF-A CJQA.

4. (D) FOCUS ARE MAJ CJTF180 DPM, CJTF180-PHQ-DEP-MCTCFT180.ARMY.NMIL.MIL, DSN 1 OR DSN (SECURE) OR LTC CJTF180 CL, CURRENT OPERATIONS, CJTF180-CHOPS-CFT180.ARMY.NMIL.MIL DSN (SECURE)

5. (U) ACKNOWLEDGE.

OLSON, MG,

OFFICIAL: [REDACTED] CJ3

END OF MESSAGE

DRV FM: NSA/CSSM 123-2
Dated: 12 MAY 04
DECL ON: 12 MAY 14

SECRET/CONFIDENTIAL

Enc W - Request for MTT
Annex 1

Exemption – B5
Annex 2

Exemption – B5
Annex 3

Exemption – B5
Annex 4

Exemption – B5
Annex 5

Exemption – B5
Annex 6

Exemption – B5
Annex 7

Exemption – B5
Annex 8

Exemption – B5
Annex 9

Exemption – B5